Doctors and patients, accountants and clients, lawyers and clients: These are all relationships that require a foundation of trust. If anyone eavesdrops on communications or hacks records, intensely personal and private matters may be exposed, and trust will be at risk. Therefore these relationships warrant particularly intense security methods for protection of computerized data.
MarpX Privacy uses patent-applied-for algorithms to obliterate patterns in data. In the current release, seven different "pattern pulverizers", one after another, are turned loose on the incoming data. There's not much that's recognizable after even the first round. Do it again! And again! ... Seven times. Messages and files treated this way are reduced to chaotic jumbles of characters. See the ongoing example and technical notes in the latter half of the tour of MarpX Privacy.
Seven "pattern pulverizers" constitute a key. The key is identified, depending on the level, by digits and letters. Recall that there are ten million unique keys for Level Two and 7.8 billion unique keys for Level Three. Those are pretty high barriers to brute force attacks.
Let's up the ante for protection of client-professional data. Set aside the ten million or 7.8 billion unique keys. Roll out a completely different set of unique pattern pulverizers and keys. This doctor and this patient alone in the world have their particular set! [That has to be qualified: An aroused and suspicious FISA court can claim access to that set. But the court and government would still have to work out what keys were used for what messages and archives.]
Suppose the professional is a lawyer with 250 clients. She orders and receives 250 flash drives, one for each client, and one special flash drive for herself. Every client drive has a unique and different set of "pattern pulverizer" key components. Clients can use this system to communicate with the lawyer and with no-one else in the world. The lawyer's flash drive has all 250 sets, each one linked to a specific client.
Beyond that, the messages and files are exchanged back and forth exactly as in the tour of MarpX Privacy.
The would-be hacker or eavesdropper is presented with an impossible problem -- even the thought of a brute force attack is foreclosed by lack of access to the unique key set. If one should be "obtained" from one client, there is absolute zero relevance to the communications between the lawyer and the other 249 clients. "Obtaining" the client's flash drive puts the hacker into close proximity with the client (expense, high risk, overtly criminal activity), all before any attempts on the data itself.
That qualifies as rather good privacy protection!